Iraqi defeat jolts Russian military

Now isn’t this a shame. After the First Persian Gulf War, I remember hearing from the then Soviet military generals on how concerned they were that the Americans had penetrated and destroyed Iraqi defenses so quickly. Back then, our response was that the Iraqis poorly implemented the defense. Fast forward twelve years later, and now it seems as if the Russians are really concerned:

The swift victory by mobile, high-tech American forces over heavily armored Iraqi troops dug in to defend large cities like Baghdad has jolted many Russian military planners. “The Iraqi Army was a replica of the Russian Army, and its defeat was not predicted by our generals,” says Vitaly Shlykov, a former deputy defense minister of Russia.

Like its Soviet prototype, Iraq’s Army was huge but made up mainly of young, poorly trained conscripts. Its battle tactics called for broad frontal warfare, with massed armor and artillery, and a highly centralized command structure. But those forces were trounced in a few days by relatively small numbers of US and British forces, who punched holes in the Iraqi front using precision weapons and seized the country’s power centers more rapidly than traditional military thinkers could have imagined. “The military paradigm has changed, and luckily we didn’t have to learn that lesson firsthand,” says Yevgeny Pashentsev, author of a book on Russian military reform. “The Americans have rewritten the textbook, and every country had better take note.”

Of course, many of the Iraqi generals were negotiated with by the Coalition forces. Additionally, no Ba’athist is going to defend something that will inevitably cease to exist. Iraq ain’t Mother Russia.

Here’s another problem. The articles comes out to say that the Russians “can afford an army comparable to those of France or Britain, but hard decisions must be made,” according to Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer. But towards what end?

Others say that Russia also must define a clear post-Soviet security doctrine. “How can we reform our Army when we have not defined the threats it must deal with?” says Mr. Dvorkin. “We must first identify our national interests, then we’ll know who our enemies might be.”

For anyone really interested, check out the Russian Federation Military Doctrine, last updated in 1993. It’s focus? Strategic Rocket Forces, a.k.a. nuclear bombs. Not an ideal focus when you have a conscript army.